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The unfortunate facts of the surface fleet disasters of 2017 are well known. We know we have cultural issues in the SWO community that have an impact paid for by the blood of our sailors. However, the presence of a series of accidents that lead to a moral reckoning, the phenomenon is relegated only to the surface community. The submarine community had one in the 2000s after the Greenville standoff. As with the surface warfare community (most recently, the 2017 Comprehensive Review and the 2010 Balisle Report), the NATOPS and CRM programs have undergone several revisions over the past several decades, leading to their evolution. However, congressional reviews and evidence are not enough to stop the erosion: concrete steps must be taken to implement the recommendations at the individual ship or squadron level.
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We are fed up with the clash of “brown shoe”, “black shoe” cultures in our Navy and it is not just the division between surface and air. It is a real irony that the naval culture of the community has created silos of knowledge and, moreover, open hostility towards those nominally our brothers and sisters in arms. It was this culture that finally led the surface community to seek answers after a terrible 2017, when the answers, of course, lay literally across the street in the Navy’s own aviation community. The death of 17 sailors that sparked a showdown in the SWO community is a moral travesty, but here we are. At the corporate level, the Under Secretary and Deputy Chief of Naval Operations are looking for improvements, but we can’t wait to hear back from “big Navy.” So we, two active duty sisters, one Surface Warfare Officer (SWO) and one pilot, decided to learn from each other and get started. VP-30, Fleet Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Replacement Squadron (FRS) and USS Lassen (DDG-82) planning, examination, execution and testing (PBED) process, safety, standardization and checklists. While the aviation community has paid cultural attention to these issues for years, the surface community has only recently opened its eyes to possible control practices and improvements in safety statistics. We will work together to accelerate the pace of improvement.
Memorandum: Women’s Royal Naval Service (new Zealand) Conditions Of Service Page 5
Culturally, the aviation community has a forty-year head start on SWO in terms of established safety and crew resource management standards. Beginning in the 1960s, the aviation industry realized that accidents were at an alarming rate and implemented the Naval Aviation Training and Operating Procedures Standardization Program (NATOPS) to ensure training was standardized. Through NATOPS, pilots monitor developments, complete minimum landings, approaches and flight times monthly and annually, and conduct biannual checks during instrument flight and emergencies. They are re-qualified in the FRS after a period of absence from flying and must be re-checked on arrival at their new squadron – even the new commander is held to these standards. The aviation community accepts these limitations as necessary for safety and holds them to the NATOPS standard. Crew resource management (CRM) programs were developed in airlines in the 1970s and moved to naval aviation in the 1980s. The program includes annual training, annual driving assessment and advanced qualifications for CRM Managers and CRM Consultants. Each pilot can list seven CRM skills and talk about how Threat and Error Management (TEM) can be implemented in a particular flight.
The emphasis on safety extends throughout aviation, from fleet organization to the culture of everyday flights. For example, in a general aviation squadron, the safety officer is an isolated department chief job, often held by a senior DH, but on a destroyer it is usually a low-priority collateral duty for the operations officer. Each flight is reported using CRM principles, and pilots are expected to verbalize the threats they face and execute time-critical ORMs to avoid them. The priority of safety is shown in many other ways; On a ship with a heliport, a very noticeable difference is the priority given to human factors, such as getting enough sleep. A pilot works hard to achieve his mandatory 8-hour crew rest before a mission; SWO will brag about how she got little sleep the night before. Both officers have to perform dangerous and technical operations, but only one is controlled by the human factor.
With Lassen on board, we are changing the SWO culture that devalues the importance of safety and the tools we have to reduce human error. To begin with, let’s talk simply about this topic. We bring in pilots to provide officer training in the Lassen locker room, including topics such as crew resource management. Although the SWO community has set a course for bridge resource management for several years, it is usually considered a “one and done” requirement rather than a cultural requirement. The VP-30 CRM Model Manager led us through a case study discussion on the importance of Threat and Error Management (TEM) and how to implement its seven principles to avoid putting the ship in an unwanted state. There is a clear need for a framework for discussing and dissecting accidents at sea, but unfortunately, CRM advice is that of Naval Air Commanders and has absolutely no relevance to SWOs, nor is there CRM training charged to SWOs. learn. Arguably, the Naval Defense Center, which nominally provides services through Naval Enterprise, has no SWO equivalent for, among other things, aircraft carrier programs, naval aviation security, and aircraft maintenance best practices. The security enterprise is simply more focused on aviation; Both because of its historical origins in air defense and because of the lack of demand from the SWO community.
In the absence of institutional support, both VP-30 and HSM WINGLANT worked with Lassen, and we developed checklists to further incorporate best practices into our daily routine. Leadership from Lassen spent a week in the daily routine of VP-30, participating in simulators and flights, discussing safety and standardization and learning about their impact on programs and culture. At VP-30 we have seen extensive use and continued development of checklists codified in the NATOPS program. Although the SWO community does not have a similar program, we are working to improve our checklists for ease of use. At Lassen, we adopted a challenge-and-response style of running a checklist and created brief guidelines for use before each bridging group took over the class. The plan-brief-execute-debrief (PBED) process is fully involved in a pilot’s life. We work towards this goal in our bridge teams.
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At VP-30, the use of high-fidelity simulators accounts for about 70% of the planned training of new pilots. These simulators are used to reinforce handling characteristics, teach emergency procedures, and even practice tactics. They can be operated in pilot-only mode, linked to tactical operators, or linked between assets. There is no such equivalent resource for the ship’s crew in Mayport. However, we have a Naval Ship Handling and Seamanship Trainer (NSST). NSST is a 2006 general ship handling simulator staffed by retired master mariners. As a basic trainer, it is useful for standard commands, basic maneuvers and decision-making training, but lacks communication and teamwork between the bridge and CIC. Recently, a small radar repeater and microphones were installed in the rear closet in an attempt to get the bridge teams used to communicating with the CIC tactical team, but the experience is unrealistic and most bridge teams do not do this exercise. Seriously.
In March 2018, the Naval Surface Forces Atlantic Command increased simulator time requirements (to 80 hours per ship per year) and introduced mandatory check runs in them before going to sea. Checkered situations are set up on high-density traffic routes that require frequent communication and skillful maneuvering. Although the ships successfully completed these assessments, they were handicapped by a lack of simulator fidelity, communications capabilities, and radar functionality. If Mayport’s simulator is to be used to keep our bridge and CIC teams efficient and proficient – a significant investment – a full upgrade is required. Building a fantastic new LCS simulator doesn’t make the rest of the fleet experts. As we continue to implement the PBED process and improve our ship handling capabilities, the Navy will need the same sophisticated equipment available in the commercial sector that the aviation community already uses. Meanwhile, we practice using our improved checklists and quick guides in the simulator, improving our competence and fluency in the language of HR management. We worked together on the simulator, helping the SWO sister aircraft deploy the crew through the sister evolution.
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